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Living and Learning as Responsive Authoring: 
Reflections on the Feminist Critiques of Merleau-Ponty’s Anonymous Body 
 





Merleau-Ponty’s idea of lived body has played a significant role in understanding self-
construction and has raised issues about the relationships between the private sense and the 
public world. Merleau-Ponty argues that the lived body and the world are constructed 
reciprocally. This notion is acknowledged to be a rich source for feminist thought. Yet there is as 
much criticism as support of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy from feminists such as Grosz (1994, 
1995), Sullivan (1997, 2000, 2001, 2002) and Young (1989). Shannon Sullivan vigorously 
criticises Merleau-Ponty’s lived body as an anonymous body which erases particularities and 
results in domination. This paper defends Merleau-Ponty’s notion by clarifying the meaning of 
anonymity in terms of the understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s lived body as an “author”, and as 
such as incorporating the capacity to resist anonymity, and sustain particularity and difference, 
through an ongoing process of authoring his/her own lived experience. Ken Plummer’s notion of 
sexual story-telling is used to elaborate the elucidation. In conclusion, the educational 
implications of resisting anonymity are considered and envisaged in terms of promoting tolerance 
of difference and assertion of particularity by encouraging and developing the capacity to 






Our own body is in the world as the heart is 
in the organism: it keeps the visible 
spectacle constantly alive, it breathes life 
into it and sustains it inwardly, and with it 
forms a system. (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/ 
2003, p. 235)  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy has been acknowledged 
to be helpful for the construction of a self who is 
embodied and contextualised with concreteness. 
Many feminist theories are inspired by the Merleau-
Pontian notion of lived body. While acknowledging 
Merleau-Ponty’s contribution to feminism, Shannon 
Sullivan nevertheless, in her “Domination and 
Dialogue in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of 
Perception” (1997) and Living Across and Through 
Skins (2001), criticises Merleau-Ponty’s lived body as 
an anonymous body, pointing to the notion as a 
falsely universalising individual. In contrast, Stoller 
(2000) and Weiss (2002) defend Merleau-Ponty’s 
idea of anonymity as entailing positive meaning for 
the construction of a unique individuality and an 
intersubjective society. In my view, Merleau-Ponty’s 
idea of lived body can be seen as a process of self-
authoring, as such implying potential for countering 
anonymity. In this sense, Weiss correctly 
demonstrates that Sullivan’s criticism attacks the 
wrong target from an incorrect approach. Merleau-
Ponty’s idea of body implies richer meanings for 
constructing intersubjectivity between different 
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bodies than Sullivan assumes. In support of the 
argument for Merleau-Ponty’s view of body as an 
author, Ken Plummer’s (1995) notions of sexual 
story-telling and intimate citizenship will furthermore 
be used to show how the body counters social 
anonymity through authoring itself as a unique being.  
 
Encountering Merleau-Ponty’s “Body”  
 
In his Phenomenology of Perception (1945/2003), 
Merleau-Ponty argues that body is the primordial 
existence of natural life. How does a body relate itself 
to other bodies, other people and this human world? 
How do bodies construct culture, civilisation, society 
and history? How is intersubjectivity and cultural life 
possible? In the section titled “Other Selves and the 
Human World”, Merleau-Ponty attempts to formulate 
an answer to these questions. In brief, body is 
fundamental for communication and understanding 
others.  
 
According to Merleau-Ponty (1945/2003), the living 
process of a body is not only a process of interacting 
with the world and others, but also a process of 
establishing one’s own selfhood. This process of 
construction of selfhood through various bodily 
movements could be understood as a process of 
increasing and constructing more and richer self-
knowledge, and as such can thus be understood as a 
development from an anonymous state to a personal 
one. As Merleau-Ponty (1945/2003) states, “[I]n pre-
natal existence, nothing was perceived, and therefore 
there is nothing to recall. There was nothing but the 
raw material and adumbration of a natural self and a 
natural time. This anonymous life is merely the 
extreme form of that temporal dispersal …” (p. 404). 
Once one is born, the activities of one’s growth, 
development, perceiving and learning take place in 
this world and during interaction with this world – or, 
in Merleau-Ponty’s terms, at least two, albeit it not 
completely separated, worlds: the natural and cultural 
worlds.  
 
In Merleau-Ponty’s view, there are different people 
and objects in this world which are destined to be 
interacted with and thereby have influence on a body. 
The interaction with the world and with others is the 
ground for developing intersubjectivity. As Merleau-
Ponty (1945/2003) states, “Not only do I have a 
physical world, not only do I live in the midst of earth, 
air, water, [but] I have around me roads, plantations, 
villages, streets, churches, implements, a bell, spoon, 
a pipe. Each of these objects is moulded to the human 
action which it serves. Each one spreads round it an 
atmosphere of humanity …” (p. 438). Consequently, 
everyone constructs his/her own lived experience 
through multifarious interactions with the objects 
surrounding him/her, whether they be natural, 
artificial or cultural objects. These objects are loaded 
and overlaid with meanings which have been 
stipulated – created by us. Through this process, each 
of us grows in and has experiences within an 
environment which brings cultural meanings to 
consciousness. Each of us thereby develops into a 
body incorporating contextual understanding and 
meaning.  
 
Based on the above, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of 
“body” turns into a historical and social being, from a 
“pre-personal” body to a “personal” one. On this 
point, some feminists (Grosz, 1994, 1995; Sullivan, 
1997, 2000, 2001, 2002; Young, 1989) criticise 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of body as neutral, 
foundational, universal and dominant. I may not 
entirely agree with these feminist accusations; yet the 
criticisms reveal the significance of the social, 
historical and ethical dimensions of body. Which 
leads to the ultimate question this paper intends to 
confront: How can an education for tolerance of 
differences be developed on the basis of the idea of 
lived body? A more detailed discussion of this debate 
in the following section may clarify the social 
meaning of body and help us to explore the 
educational implications. 
 
Revisiting the Feminist Debate on Merleau-
Ponty’s Body 
 
One of the most ferocious criticisms of Merleau-
Ponty’s idea of lived body may be that of Shannon 
Sullivan, despite her acknowledgement of Merleau-
Ponty’s contribution to feminism. The thrust of her 
critique is that Merleau-Ponty’s idea of the lived body 
is an anonymous, impersonal and solipsistic body. 
According to Sullivan, this anonymity results in the 
ignoring of particularities and differences in various 
aspects, such as gender, class and nation. Moreover, 
there is no hope of amendment due to the inability of 
communication for a solipsistic body. Therefore, 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy could result in various 
forms of domination. In my view, Sullivan’s critiques 
are dubious, since she ignores one very important 
feature of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, namely its 
view of the living body as a dialectical, dynamic and 
becoming process. Let us thus look at the details of 
Sullivan’s critiques. Two main points can be found: 
one is related to the understanding of anonymity and 
the other to communication. These two points are 
interrelated. 
 
Firstly, according to Sullivan, the Merleau-Pontian 
body is an anonymous, impotent, unable and 
solipsistic subject. Sullivan (1997) points out that 
“my existence is impersonal because the ‘other’s 
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living body has the same structure as mine’ (Merleau-
Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 353 [1945/2003, p. 412]). I am 
like you and you are like me on some fundamental 
level. As the word ‘anonymous’ indicates, my bodily 
identity is unknown in that it is not uniquely mine; in 
some sense it is that of anyone and thus of everyone.” 
Accordingly, “the trace of anonymous existence that 
appears in both of our bodies referred to by Merleau-
Ponty is found in their similarity ...” (p. 5). Based on 
the above, Sullivan’s accusation is that “Merleau-
Ponty’s anonymous body imposes a commonality 
upon different bodies and, in doing so, impedes the 
very dialogue between embodied subjects that his 
account seeks to make possible” (Sullivan, 1997, p. 8). 
The particularities which have been effaced include 
culture, gender, sexuality, class, nationality, race, 
upbringing, and positions of authority that the body is 
in. Sullivan (2001) argues that these differences are 
the hallmarks for locating the marginalised circles. If 
the anonymous body is taken as primordial existence, 
as Merleau-Ponty suggests, an assumption is implied 
of “pre-gender or pre-upbringing similarity of the 
meaning of bodily behaviour” (Sullivan, 1997, p, 6). 
The differences and particularities will thus be 
ignored and even ruled out of the sphere of public life. 
The Merleau-Pontian view thus leads to a dominant 
view of society.  
 
With regard to this aspect, various authors, including 
Weiss (2002) and Stoller (2000), point out that 
Sullivan misunderstands the ideas of anonymity and 
anonymous body in Merleau-Ponty’s thought. 
According to Weiss (2002, p. 194), Sullivan confuses 
the concept of anonymous body with that of universal 
or trans-historical body. Stoller (2000, p. 176) is 
similarly of the opinion that Sullivan “confuses 
anonymity with neutrality”. Sullivan’s (2002) 
response to Stoller and Weiss is to distinguish 
between anonymity and generality, or bad and good 
anonymity. Generality, from Sullivan’s perspective, 
will not erase particularities of bodies. There are both 
general and particular aspects of persons. 
 
While the ambiguity of Merleau-Ponty’s reference to 
anonymous body or pre-personal body is 
acknowledged, this does not mean that Merleau-
Ponty’s anonymous body is equivalent to Sullivan’s 
(bad) anonymity. If this idea is considered against the 
background of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, we may 
find that the notion of anonymity which Sullivan 
criticises is not the one inferred by Merleau-Ponty. 
 
The idea of anonymity can be understood in at least 
two ways. One is subjective or ontological anonymity, 
which denotes a pre-reflective consciousness as 
underpinning one’s own lived experience. The other 
is objective or social anonymity, which denotes an 
impersonal state of existence immersed in collectivity. 
The former type is what Merleau-Ponty emphasises in 
his Phenomenology of Perception. It is anonymity in 
respect of a private self. For example, Merleau-Ponty 
writes that,  
 
At the very moment when I live in the world, 
when I am given over to my plans, my 
occupations, my friends, my memories, I can 
close my ears, lose my self in some pleasure 
or pain, and shut myself up in the anonymous 
life which subtends my personal one. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2003, p. 191) 
 
This anonymous body denotes the primordial and 
embryonic aspect of the lived body. This body, like 
an embryo, keeps developing during the process of 
interaction with other bodies and society. During this 
process, one’s own selfhood or personhood is 
gradually constructed. Thus it can be understood as 
anonymous or pre-personal. This body in this respect 
is naming itself through self-construction, and this 
process never ends. Since a fixed identity can never 
be completely achieved, this body is in a dialectic of 
anonymising and naming. The commonality here 
denotes only the process and not the end. Every body 
has the potential and ability to become a unique 
individual through the process of interaction with the 
world and other bodies. This does not imply that the 
development of the body will be limited and regulated 
by a particular substantial condition.   
 
The latter type of anonymity is understood in respect 
of public self. It can be understood in terms of the 
sociological perspective of Schütz and Natanson 
(Weiss, 2002). According to Schütz (1962) and 
Natanson (1973), most social interactions are 
anonymous. For example, “the postal clerk”, “the 
poker player” and “the miser” are used to describe 
people encountered in everyday life. These roles – or, 
in the terms of Schütz (1962) and Natanson (1973),  
social types – are certain general bodies, impersonal 
and anonymous. In this view, individuals are thus 
understood as certain social types. As Natanson (1973, 
pp. 16-17) explains, “Typification is the blood of my 
daily life. Alfred Schütz writes: ‘The factual world of 
our experience ... is experienced from the outset as a 
typical one … what has been experienced in the 
actual perception of one object is apperceptively 
transferred to any similar object, perceived merely as 
to its type.’ The social dimension of daily existence – 
its ‘we’ character – amounts to a sharing of typified 
constructs and interpretations.” The concept of 
anonymity in Schütz and Natanson’s philosophy thus 
describes the anonymous state of individuals known 
in the eyes of sociologists by their social roles rather 
than their personal or private characteristics.  
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Sullivan misunderstands Merleau-Ponty’s anonymous 
body in the terms of Schütz and Natanson. Although 
Sullivan defends herself by distinguishing generality 
and anonymity, the discussion still remains on the 
level of society and collectivity rather than on the 
ontological level. For example, Sullivan argues that it 
is important to generalise about women and breast 
cancer as distinct from men’s health. It could be 
beneficial to separate men from women with respect 
to health; however, what is important is that the 
benefits cannot be traded for the fact that men and 
women are to some extent anonymised. Although 
Sullivan’s further explanation that “the problem with 
the concept of anonymity is that it takes generality to 
such a high level of abstraction that it tends to 
become perniciously divorced from concrete, lived 
experience” (2002, p. 206) makes a clear distinction 
between generality and anonymity, neither concept is 
Merleau-Pontian. In this sense, it is thus unfair to ask 
Merleau-Ponty to be responsible for a problem which 
he does not create.  
 
Secondly, Sullivan (1997, 2000, 2001) criticises 
Merleau-Ponty’s idea of body as impeding 
communication between subjects because of an 
implied ethical solipsism. As mentioned earlier, 
Merleau-Ponty proposes the body as a “common” 
ground for intersubjective communication:  
 
I experience my own body as the power of 
adopting certain forms of behaviours and a 
certain world, and I am given to myself 
merely as a certain hold upon the world; 
now, it is precisely my body which 
perceives the body of another, and 
discovers in that other body a miraculous 
prolongation of my own intentions, a 
familiar way of dealing with the world. 
Henceforth, as the parts of my body 
together comprise a system, so my body 
and the other’s are one whole … . 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2003, p. 412) 
 
In Sullivan’s (1997, 2000, 2001, 2002) reading of the 
above paragraph, the prolongation of one’s body and 
intention of dealing with other intentions and bodies 
implies an erasure of individual differences and 
imposition of one’s will upon the other. Therefore, 
the communication between different bodies has been 
destroyed and the possibility of establishing 
intersubjectivity seems to be nullified.  
 
My response to the above critique is that Sullivan 
ignores a crucial feature of Merleau-Ponty’s body as a 
process of dynamic interaction between subject and 
object. Following on from the above quotation, 
Merleau-Ponty (1945/2003) writes that “my body and 
the other’s are one whole, two sides of one and the 
same phenomenon, and the anonymous existence of 
which my body is the ever-renewed trace henceforth 
inhabits both bodies simultaneously” (p. 412). This 
paragraph reveals the significance of the other as a 
part of my body. In other words, my body is not a 
solipsistic ego in this world; it is constituted in the 
interaction with and incorporation of many other 
bodies. That is why Merleau-Ponty describes a body 
as a “dual being” (1945/2003, p. 413). In addition, 
this incorporation of the other does not imply ruling 
out differences, as Merleau-Ponty (1945/2003) points 
out that “our situation cannot be superimposed on 
each other … we undertake some project in common, 
this common project is not one single project, it does 
not appear in the selfsame light to both of us, we are 
not both equally enthusiastic about it, or at any rate 
not in quite the same way …” (p. 415). It can be seen 
that the Merleau-Pontian body denotes an individual 
who is constructed through a process of ongoing 
interaction with other bodies. The other, in some 
sense, is an alien external to me, and, in another sense, 
is an internal part of my life. The living process is 
open to various forms of differentiation, integration 
and communication. Sullivan’s interpretation of 
Merleau-Ponty is thus not fully convincing.  
 
Moreover, Sullivan’s thought, in my view, implies a 
tendency towards reification and substantiation of 
“differences”, such as gender, class, culture and 
nationality. Sullivan asserts that these differences are 
prior to commonalities: “... a common ground is 
something for which we must strive, not a starting 
point from which we depart. Our similarities are 
something which must be created so that we can co-
exist as subjects …” (Sullivan, 1997, p. 8). In her 
view, similarities are built by the anonymous body on 
the ground of “differences”. These differences, such 
as gender, class and culture, are unchangeable 
foundations of one’s life. However, in my opinion, 
Sullivan’s understanding of “difference” and 
“similarity” (or “commonality”) is not on Merleau-
Ponty’s path. The Sullivanian differences are 
constructed and posterior to Merleau-Ponty’s (not 
Sullivan’s) anonymous body. Sullivan’s differences 
are actually commonalities which are constituted in a 
group of bodies through collective action, whether 
intersubjectively or not. They are social categories (or 
typifications) which are constructed by many. The 
most important point is that, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, 
these social categories are not absolute, but 
contingent limitations for every individual, because 
they can be adjusted, reconstructed and reworked. 
Following Merleau-Ponty, either differences or 
similarities are open to change, because both are 
constructed by bodies in the natural and social worlds.  
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In contrast, Sullivan’s social categories are enclosures 
imposing on and defining people. There are twofold 
misunderstandings in Sullivan’s assertions in this 
regard. As she states, “Only if we get rid of Merleau-
Ponty’s anonymous body, do we create a genuine 
option of breaking out of the solipsistic 
subjectivity … . In attending to bodies as woven with 
a variety of different, particular strands, dialogue with 
another becomes possible …” (Sullivan, 1997, p. 8); 
moreover, “[W]e start with our differences, that 
differences need not be seen as equivalent as the end 
of community, and that similarity is a construction, 
not a given starting-point” (Sullivan, 1997, p. 17, n. 
4). Firstly, Merleau-Ponty’s anonymous body is 
(mis)understood in terms of social roles; secondly, the 
differences are (mis)conceived as unchangeable and 
essential social categories. Sullivan thus uses a flawed 
arrow to aim at a target which does not exist.   
 
Overall, the discussion of feminist criticism helps to 
raise some important questions related to the 
Merleau-Pontian anonymous body and education. 
Even though Sullivan misunderstands Merleau-Ponty 
to some extent, she illuminates the perplexity of the 
lived body in society: is this lived body an enabling, 
constituting and choosing agent or an object of 
constitutive acts (Butler, 1988)? How does Merleau-
Ponty’s “body”, as an ontologically anonymous body, 
become socialised? What is the relationship between 
the individual and the social world? How does a lived, 
pre-reflected body become a reflected citizen, 
possessing a certain common membership with others, 
and at the same time sustain its own particular 
individuality? How can this body develop into a 
unique person through sharing and assimilating 
commonalities? In other words, how does this lived 
body retain its own uniqueness during the process of 
social anonymisation? For example, how is a body 
gendered without being reduced to a mere type in the 
form of man or woman? How does such education 
take place? These questions converge on the 
public/private split. One crucial feature implied in this 
lived body, which can be helpful to answering this 
question, would seem to be the ability of authoring. 
This will be illustrated in the following sections.  
 
Authoring Through Body: Sexual Story-Telling 
 
The feminist challenge to the Merleau-Pontian body 
reveals the significance of a more detailed exploration 
of how the lived body constitutes itself and is 
constituted as an object and subject in society. The 
Merleau-Pontian body is taken by many as providing 
a basis for connecting the pre-conscious and 
conscious life (Butt & Langdridge, 2003). Among 
many aspects of the lived body, the act of authoring 
could be taken as crucial for understanding this 
interrelationship between self and group, between a 
single pre-reflected anonymous body and the 
collective anonymous society.  
 
Take the issue of sex/gender as an example. Merleau-
Ponty does not clearly distinguish sex from gender, 
but yet his idea inspires many feminists and 
phenomenologists to make this distinction. They 
argue against “naturalistic explanation of sex and 
sexuality which assumes that the meaning of 
women’s social existence can be derived from some 
fact of their physiology” (Butler, 1988, p. 520). The 
point stressed by Merleau-Ponty is the body’s ability, 
dynamics and activity. As he states: “[A]ll human 
‘functions’ from sexuality to motility and intelligence, 
are rigorously unified in one synthesis” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1945/2003, p. 197). Sexuality is one kind of 
bodily motility, one type of function among various 
living functions. In addition, Merleau-Ponty claims 
that “Man is a historical idea and not a natural 
species” (1945/2003, p. 198). Although he does not 
privilege sexuality as a basis for understanding human 
beings, this paragraph is inspiring for Butler. Butler 
(1988) accordingly suggests two points to understand 
the meanings of human as historical: firstly, body is 
not completely predetermined by any interior essence; 
secondly, the understanding of bodily expression in 
the world must be contextually, historically and 
specifically understood. Thus Merleau-Ponty provides 
a starting point for a feminist discussion of gender.  
 
I do not mean that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy takes 
gender or sex as a particular necessity for a person to 
find “in” his/her physical body. Rather, gender is a 
historical category for a person to embody in his/her 
consciousness and, in turn, also an effect of this 
embodiment. That is why Merleau-Ponty does not 
privilege sexuality among various forms of bodily 
mobility – even though, for feminists, it could be the 
most crucial element for self-construction. However, 
that is not the focus of this paper. What interests me 
more is the issue related to gender and its 
manifestation from the private realm to the public 
sphere. It shows the bodily ability of authoring from 
the private realm to the public realm, with the 
authoring body thus becoming a fluid being 
alternating between these two fields. Ken Plummer’s 
(1995) exploration of the documenting of “sexual 
stories” provides an appropriate illustration of the 
fluid authoring body.  
 
According to Plummer (1995), sexual stories could be 
a genre as old as human history. Yet, in modern times, 
three kinds of sexual stories are given significant 
attention: rape survival stories, homosexual “coming 
out” stories, and “recovery” stories. These three kinds 
of sexual stories are what Plummer calls “modernist 
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tales” with clear structures: suffering, surviving and 
surpassing. Here the women’s stories concerning 
many feminists could be included, such as stories 
about abortion, pregnancy, maternity. Discussion of 
the details of these stories is not the aim of this paper. 
What I aim to explore from the phenomenon of telling 
sexual stories is, more particularly, the following 
question: In what sense and in what context does an 
individual tell his/her own life story to publicise 
his/her private lived experience? One interesting 
move implied in these modernist sexual stories may 
need to be noted: a move from suffering, secrecy and 
a sense of victimisation to therapy, survival, recovery 
or politics. A direction in this process can be 
discerned: it is moving from the private realm 
towards the public sphere.  
 
Plummer (1995) proposes the idea of “intimate 
citizenship” to explain how these new stories and new 
claims around the body and sexuality arise or evolve, 
defining intimate citizenship as “concerned with all 
those matters linked to our most intimate desires, 
pleasures and ways of being in the world” (Plummer, 
1995, p 151). 
 
The concept of intimate citizenship denotes a realm 
comprising private and public spheres. A central site 
of concern for stories of intimate citizenship, 
according to Plummer and Merleau-Ponty, is “body”. 
The Merleau-Pontian body is a pivot for living in the 
world: “[S]ight, hearing, sexuality, the body, are not 
only the routes, instruments or manifestation of 
personal existence” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2003, p. 
185). One crucial requirement for the subjects in these 
stories finally to recover from suffering is the activity 
of story-telling. In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, these 
bodies are involved in “a relationship of reciprocal 
expression” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2003, p. 185). 
“[O]f all bodily functions speech is the most 
intimately linked with communal existence, or, as we 
put it, co-existence” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2003, p. 
186). Accordingly, story-telling, or speaking one’s 
lived experience, can be seen as a part of the bodily 
construction of self. This self is a private person as 
well as a public citizen. A body can be either private 
or public on different occasions, at different times, 
and in different contexts. Moreover, the boundary 
between the private and public is continuously 
shifting and evolving through time. Hence these 
modernist sexual stories, which could have been 
concealed in private space and handed down in 
secrecy in old times, can now be spoken, heard and 
studied openly in public. Whether it be in secrecy or 
in public, bodily expression is the key to defining the 
temporary boundary and constituting him/herself 
continuously. This process is what I call “authoring” 
(Hung, 2009), which could be embodied through 
various forms of expression such as narrating, writing, 
drawing and photographing.  
 
What is interesting and paradoxical is that, in order to 
become an author, this body needs to publicise his/her 
privacy in some respects: a body needs other bodies 
in order to be different from the others. Voicing, 
conversation or dialogue is one means of opening a 
body’s private realm.  
 
In the experience of dialogue, there is 
constituted between the other person and 
myself a common ground; my thought and 
his are interwoven into a single fabric, my 
words and those of my interlocutors are 
called forth by the state of discussion, and 
they are inserted into a shared operation of 
which neither of us is the creator. We are 
here a dual being … we are collaborators 
for each other in consummate reciprocity. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2003, p. 413) 
 
Dialogue between two does not necessarily equate 
with publicising, but it implies the possibility of 
opening oneself to, and inviting participation of the 
other in, self-construction. Thus a dialogue is co-
constituted by the interlocutors, but neither of them 
monopolises the authorship. Yet, from the perspective 
of the interlocutors, they are giving authorship of their 
own respective lifeworlds; they are giving expression 
from inside to out. Their works are their own living 
processes which incorporate traces of their dialogues 
with others. The numerous and varied dialogues and 
encounters in one’s life help one to become a unique 
author, however, no two persons’ “pick and mix” 
being the same. Moreover, there could be more than 
two persons participating in some of the dialogues 
and encounters, and this makes our own private and 
personal expression and ideas more (but never 
completely) public. As Plummer reveals, the 
publication of private experiences helps to achieve 
intimate citizenship. Welcoming and inviting more 
private stories may thus help to establish a more 
tolerant and caring common world within which 
every body could more freely become a unique author. 
 
All in all, the above discussion reveals that, from 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of lived body, it can be 
inferred that the body is an author and that the living 
process is an ongoing process of authoring the 
lifeworld of the body. We may conclude that, in 
Merleau-Ponty’s view, the lived body as an authoring 
agent is emerging from embryonic anonymity. This 
counters the social anonymity which could dissolve 
individual differences and particularities. The aim of 
the final section will be to explore how to envisage an 
education that would enable learners to become 
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authors of themselves and to confront collective 
anonymity.  
 
Concluding Remarks: Education as Enabling One 
to Self-Author Responsively 
 
The expression of one’s lived experience helps to 
achieve an intimate citizenship which aims to provide 
a field including individual, different, idiosyncratic 
and incommensurable life stories.  In this sense, the 
authoring body can be seen as a unique citizen 
through his/her own living experience. If we take a 
broader view, every body is authoring him/herself – 
as long as he/she lives and expresses as long as he/she 
lives. In this sense, it seems futile to discuss the 
meaning of education and self-construction as 
creating authorship, since one authors, unavoidably, 
as one lives. Nevertheless, if we are not aware of our 
own life with adequate responsiveness, sensitivity, 
perceptivity and criticality, we tend to be immersed in 
anonymous, or passive, more or less static states of 
being: we tend to see ourselves and others through the 
lens of collectivity; we tend to generalise people, 
type-cast and stereotype them, and thereby ignore or 
suppress individual particularities. This could be 
understood as a certain immersion in social 
anonymity. Thus an educational view that values 
individual differences and diversity might gain 
inspiration from the idea of authoring body. 
Following this, a narrower but more rigorous view 
might be more appropriate for understanding the idea 
of authoring body, which means that the educational 
authoring activities should be undertaken with greater 
responsiveness to difference, sensitivity, perceptivity 
and criticality. Then, how to raise our sensitivity and 
criticality becomes very important for the authoring 
view of education. Two thoughts are proposed here in 
this regard. 
 
First of all, the more knowledge of and access to the 
means of communication and expression one acquires, 
the more opportunities one has for telling one’s 
stories. Education concerning this should thus provide 
sufficient resources for students to learn about the 
various forms of expression, such as speaking, 
painting, writing, drama, acting and a multitude of 
other means.  
 
Secondly, this process of self-construction takes place 
in the boundary between the body and the world, 
between the private and the public, between 
individual and community. This boundary is blurred, 
floating and changing all the time, since it is the 
territory within which these interactions occur. While 
it could set the limit to how and what we think, live 
and act, it can be challenged, transgressed and 
changed by our embodied action or actions. The 
dialectical and changing relationships between 
individual and society differ from person to person, 
from group to group, and thereby are always subject 
to transformation and change. Plummer’s study of 
sexual stories shows that there are different kinds of 
stories and different definitions of the relationships 
between the public and the private in different periods 
of time. The boundary and the relationships could and 
should be changed if these human constructs do not 
promote, but instead impede, human freedom and 
bring suffering and hardship. This could be the most 
important point in education.  
 
According to Merleau-Ponty, the anonymous body is 
the primordial and personal base for constructing and 
developing the self. It has been argued that this 
Merleau-Pontian anonymous body is misunderstood 
by feminists as an anonymous existence in Schütz’s 
and Natanson’s terms. However, while Sullivan’s 
critique is misdirected, it is insightful in so far as it 
manifests the neutrality and abstractness of a socially 
anonymous existence. Yet this socially anonymous 
being is not what Merleau-Ponty wants to promote; 
on the contrary, his notion has the potential to inspire 
us to strive to overcome social anonymity, and, in the 
process, to envisage what education aimed at enabling 
students to be responsive and responsible authors of 
their own lives would entail. Every body is his/her 
own author within a co-existent world. Yet, it is 
important to recognize that the co-existence of and 
interdependence between human beings could in fact 
lead to over-reliance on and immersion in anonymous 
existence. If lacking reflection and responsiveness, 
we could lose the authorship of our own lives in the 
living situation. Education in this regard should thus 
remind us of the significance of living as responsive 
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